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1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
For more than a hundred years, the self-present, self-sufficient, autonomous, 
self-conscious, rational “subject” has been repeatedly called into question by 
many different authors and even traditions. This “subject”, which had often 
lured us onto wrong paths and into apparent or specious philosophical problems 
(not to mention its contribution to the forgetfulness of being, see Heidegger 
1986 and 1996), and which in the 20th century – the period of the most critical 
self-criticism of philosophy – it was felt ought to have been eliminated or 
deconstructed, has been said to be a historical contingency, fabricated in the 
history of philosophy at some point in the past. Its fabrication seems to go back 
in the history of philosophy as far as the Greeks (hypokeimenon, ousia, see 
Derrida 1973: 147) but in a somewhat more explicit and rigorous form (the 
theory of knowledge) to Descartes and his distinction of two substances, res 
extensa and res cogitans (Descartes 2008: 19–20)1. It is at any rate noteworthy 
that the topics of “subject” and “subjectivity” were so important in 20th century 
“continental philosophy” (but the relevance of these topics does not seem to 
have disappeared in the 21st century, for example in the so-called “new pheno-
menology”2) that it is hard to find an author who did not, from one perspective 
or another, express his views on the matter – to the point where some thinkers, 
particularly Jacques Derrida and Simon Critchley, began to raise doubts about 
whether such a unified “subject” with unchangeable and fixed characteristics 
has ever purely existed in philosophy or was rather retrospectively read into its 
history. In other words, do we find exactly the same treatment of the “subject” 
in the works of e.g. Leibniz, Descartes, Kant and Hegel? Perhaps there is no 
homogeneous history of the unified “subject” but rather an amalgam of 
complex, complicated and ambiguous histories of quite different treatments of 
it? As Derrida puts it in one interview: “There has never been The subject for 
anyone, that’s what I wanted to begin by saying. The subject is a fable […].” 
(Derrida 1991: 102)3 With this, however, Derrida is not saying that the problem 
of the “subject” does not have common roots or that there are no evident 
similarities, analogies or shared characteristics between different conceptuali-
zations of it. It is precisely these roots and analogies, but no less discrepancies 
and differences, that need to be studied genealogically in order to arrive at an 
understanding and description of somewhat more veridical histories of the 
“subject”. 
                                                     
1  Cf. Luik 2002. 
2  Cf. Zahavi 2005. 
3  Cf. Simon Critchley (1996:22): “Has there ever exited a unified conscious subject, a 
watertight Cartesian ego? Or is the subject some phantasy or abstraction that is retrospec-
tively attributed to the past that one wants either to exceed, betray or ignore? That is to say, 
is not the subject a fiction that Kant finds in Descartes, without it being in Descartes, what 
Heidegger finds in Kant without it being in Kant, or that Derrida finds in Husserl without it 
being in Husserl?” 
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This is not, however, the topic of this dissertation. Issues related to the 
“subject” are quite important to this study and do make up a substantial part of 
it, but they are only important insofar as the traditional way of understanding 
decision-making – the concept of decision, both traditional and heretic, being 
the theme of this study – requires and has always required a certain, more or 
less limited, more or less coherent idea of the “subject”. At the same time, con-
sidering the reservations of Derrida and Critchley, it is not presumed that this 
idea is completely homogeneous and watertight; nevertheless, it does seem to 
be based on certain analogies and similar characteristics. Now, taking into 
account that some of the constant properties of the subject have been questioned 
from all possible perspectives with increasing intensity, what will happen to 
decision that is based on that understanding? If, for example, the idea of a self-
present, rational and autonomous decision-maker is no longer entirely trust-
worthy, if we have convincing reasons to doubt its trustworthiness, then it is no 
longer possible to understand decision as an active, free and autonomous pheno-
menon based on rational deliberations, as is still done quite frequently in diffe-
rent philosophical traditions. Decision and the closely related concept of respon-
sibility should therefore be re-thematized, without presuming a predominantly 
autonomous and rational agent, or if we wish to talk about a “rational” decision-
maker or agent in the future, then the concepts of “rationality” and reason 
should probably be expanded considerably. 
Although the “subject” has come under heavy criticism for a long time now, 
there remain relatively few re-conceptualizations of the aforementioned con-
cepts. Perhaps one of the biggest challenges in the philosophy of the 21st 
century, taking into consideration that a strictly autonomous and rational “sub-
ject” or decision-maker has lost its certainty and credibility, is precisely to 
provide a new description and interpretation of phenomena like decision and 
responsibility (and therefore understand in a new and adequate way that which 
in philosophical literature has been referred to as the agency). Jacques Derrida 
has, in his own interesting and provocative way, answered this challenge or 
difficulty exactly by situating decision in comparison to most of the earlier 
treatments of this matter on quite a different footing and foundation (if it were 
still be pertinent here to speak of a “foundation”, which it actually is not). The 
analyses and “evaluation” of Derrida’s re-interpretation of decision provided in 
this thesis can be understood as a general contribution to a more adequate grasp 
of phenomena like “decision”, “responsibility” and “agency” when certain 




2. TOPIC AND STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The study, which consists of six articles and this summary, is thus centred on 
the concept of decision or, to be more precise, on two conceptions of decision 
that are in many ways interrelated and at the same time radically different. One 
of these conceptions, which could also be referred to as the traditional or domi-
nant description of decision, originates, according to the thesis, from Aristotle; 
the other, which in this study is called the heretical concept of decision, can be 
found in the works of Jacques Derrida. It has to be emphasized that Derrida 
himself has neither described his understanding of decision as heretical nor 
opposed it in an explicit and systematic way to that which in this thesis is called 
Aristotle’s traditional and dominating concept. The central aim and main contri-
bution of this study is precisely to demonstrate that Derrida’s thematisation of 
decision can in a very interesting way be conceived as heretical with respect to 
Aristotle’s traditional concept. 
Taking the aforesaid into account, the thesis can be divided into three parts: 
the first provides an interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding of decision, 
discusses its weaknesses and highlights the presuppositions and concepts (such 
as virtue, deliberation, activity and the voluntary) that form its basis. The 
second part contrasts Aristotle’s concept with Derrida’s heretical “concept” of 
decision, which, as has been thoroughly demonstrated, not only problematizes 
or radicalizes many of the aspects of Aristotelian treatment but also breaks 
away from it in some important respects. Some philosophical support has also 
been given to Derrida’s approach. These two parts are included in Article I, the 
lengthiest in the thesis. The third part, which according to logical structure and 
sequence should fall between the two previously mentioned parts, is concerned 
with Derrida’s and Nietzsche’s criticism of the “subject”. This criticism is 
viewed as one of the main reasons why Derrida modifies and undermines the 
Aristotelian concept of decision. In other words, criticizing the “subject” that is 
identical to itself, self-aware and autonomous not only allows but also obligates 
Derrida to re-interpret such moral and philosophical phenomena as decision and 
responsibility. This deconstruction, therefore, creates a certain opening needed 
for Derrida’s argument to get underway. Although this dissertation is mostly 
concerned with Aristotle and Derrida, who are herein treated as signifiers of two 
very different “traditions” of the concept of decision, it is impossible to ignore 
Friedrich Nietzsche when it comes to the topic of the “subject", as he signifi-
cantly influenced Derrida in the way the latter problematizes and deconstructs 
the “subject”. The topic of the subject is analysed in Articles II, III and (par-
tially) IV, which examine the common ground between Nietzsche’s and Derri-
da’s deconstruction of the subject; and then also in Articles V and VI, which 
concentrate almost exclusively on Nietzsche’s criticism of the subject. How-
ever, Nietzsche is not the only one who had an impact on Derrida in that 
respect – in fact, Derrida said that he was greatly influenced by Martin Heideg-
ger and Sigmund Freud, for example. In this case, what would justify 
Nietzsche’s special role in this thesis? First of all, Nietzsche seems to have been 
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a little more influential on Derrida’s thinking than Heidegger or Freud (see 
Derrida 1972: 29; 2002: 215–256)4. Secondly, Nietzsche was one of the first, 
one of the fiercest and, I dare say, one of the clearest critics of consciousness, 
“subject” and “subjectivity”. Through him and based on him, it is easier to 
understand what came after him. Thirdly, it is impossible to consider and 
explore everything concerning this topic in one dissertation; some gaps inevi-
tably remain and will need to be filled later or by someone else. And fourthly, to 
the extent that the previous reasoning does not suffice, this also represents a 
decision or a choice in a certain Derrida-like sense. 
All of the articles mentioned above have been written over the course of 
about four years and in a sequence that is somewhat different to their final order 
in the dissertation. Article IV was the earliest to be written, in 2009; Article III 
came second, in 2010; a year later, Article II, which is a thematic elaboration, 
development and expansion in English of Article III (written in German), was 
completed; Article I, which is placed as the first in this dissertation, was written 
in 2012. In the interests of accuracy and correctness, one might add that Article 
I that was finished last but became the first article in this study was actually in 
some sense started before all of the others. The articles in Estonian (V and VI) 
were written in 2011 and in the beginning of 2012 respectively. 
This introductory article, which provides a certain prologue to the articles of 
the thesis, is meant to create a sort of wholeness by bringing the articles 
together, relating them to one another and filling in some of the thematic gaps 
left by them. It has three main tasks or goals: firstly, to explain what is meant by 
“subject” and its deconstruction in this study and how Aristotle’s traditional 
concept of decision presumes that classical “subject” (this explanation being 
necessary because apparently it is not self-evident that Aristotle’s thinking 
could include something that might be considered a “subject”); secondly, to 
analyse the sense in which and the reasons why Aristotle’s idea of decision is 
treated as a traditional and dominant one in this thesis; and finally, to consider 
and briefly analyse the advantages and disadvantages of Derrida’s heretical 
concept over the traditional notion of decision. 
 
  
                                                     
4  Cf. Anderson 2003. 
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3. CHARACTERISTICS AND  
“DECONSTRUCTION” OF “SUBJECT” 
Let us, then, take a closer look at what is meant by “subject” and its deconst-
ruction in this study, as it may not be self-evident at first glance that the 
deconstruction of the “subject” conducted by Derrida and Nietzsche (which, it 
must be emphasized, is not disposing of the “subject” or the death of the “sub-
ject”, as many have understood, but re-interpreting and re-situating the “sub-
ject”5) could somehow undermine Aristotle’s concept of decision. After all, the 
question “was there really anything like the “subject” in ancient philosophy?” 
seems perfectly justified. And if there was, then what kind of “subject”? As 
previously mentioned, this thesis does not attempt to present the histories of the 
“subject“; it is only essential to demonstrate that, at least in part and to a certain 
extent, Nietzsche’s and Derrida’s criticism of the “subject” does include 
presuppositions of Aristotle’s notion of decision, be they implicit or explicit.6 
This also applies when considering that the main weight of Nietzsche’s and 
Derrida’s criticism is not directed solely towards Aristotle, not even above all, 
but to a somewhat more contemporary concept of “subject”. Not only does this 
paper criticise the concept of decision of Aristotle himself but also the so-called 
Aristotelian concept as the traditional one; later, in Chapter 4 of this summary, 
this idea (Aristotle’s concept being the traditional one) is explained in more 
detail. However, first we must delimit and explain the “subject” as it is under-
stood in this study. 
 
a. Self-presence and Rationality 
 
The first important clue or intimation to what is meant by “subject” in this 
dissertation comes from an aphorism of Friedrich Nietzsche “titled” Die Unbe-
kannte Welt des “Subjects” from Morgenröthe. Gedanken über die moralischen 
Vorurtheile (1881): 
 
Die unbekannte Welt  des  »Subjects«.  – Das, was den Menschen so 
schwer zu begreifen fällt, ist ihre Unwissenheit über sich selber, von den ältesten 
Zeiten bis jetzt! Nicht nur in bezug auf gut und böse, sondern in Bezug auf viel 
Wesentlicheres! Noch immer lebt der uralte Wahn, dass man wisse, ganz genau 
                                                     
5  Regarding this problem, Derrida (1984: 125) had the following to say: “I have never said 
that the subject should be dispensed with. Only that it should be deconstructed. To 
deconstruct the subject does not mean to deny its existence. There are subjects, “operations” 
or “effects” (effets) of subjectivity. This is an incontrovertible fact. To acknowledge this 
does not mean, however, that the subject is what it says it is. The subject is not some meta-
linguistic substance or identity, some pure cogito of self-presence; it is always inscribed in 
language. My work does not, therefore, destroy the subject; it simply tries to resituate it.” 
6  Hence, the aim here is not to treat all the possible similarities, subtleties and twists of 
Nietzsche’s and Derrida’s “deconstruction” of the “subject”.  
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wisse, wie das menschl iche Handeln  zu  Stande komme, in jedem 
Falle. Nicht nur »Gott, der in‘s Herz sieht«, nicht nur der Thäter, der seine That 
überlegt, – nein, auch jeder Andere zweifelt nicht, das Wesentliche im Vorgange 
der Handlung jedes Andern zu verstehen. »Ich weiß, was ich will, was ich gethan 
habe, ich bin frei und verantwortlich dafür, ich mache den Andern verant-
wortlich, ich kann alle sittlichen Möglichkeiten und alle inneren Bewegungen, 
die es vor einer Handlung giebt, beim Namen nennen; ihr mögt handeln, wie ihr 
wollt, – ich verstehe darin mich und euch Alle!” – so dachte ehemals Jeder, so 
denkt fast noch Jeder. Sokrates und Plato, in diesem Stücke große Zweifler und 
bewunderungswürdige Neuerer, waren doch harmlos gläubig in Betreff jenes 
verhängnisvollsten Vorurtheils, jenes tiefsten Irrthums, dass »der richtigen 
Erkenntniss die richtige Handlung folgen müsse«, – sie waren in diesem 
Grundsatze immer noch die Erben des allgemeinen Wahnsinns und Dünkels: 
dass es ein Wissen um das Wesen einer Handlung gebe. »Es wäre ja 
schreckl ich , wenn der Einsicht in das Wesen der rechten That nicht die rechte 
That folgte«, – diess ist die einzige Art, wie jene Grossen diesen Gedanken zu 
beweisen für nötig hielten, das Gegentheil schien ihnen undenkbar und toll – und 
doch ist diess Gegenteil gerade die nackte, seit Ewigkeiten täglich und stündlich 
bewiesene Wirklichkeit! Ist es nicht gerade die “schreckliche” Wahrheit: dass, 
was man von einer That überhaupt wissen kann, n iemals  ausreicht, sie zu thun, 
dass die Brücke von der Erkenntniss zur That in keinem einzigen Falle bisher 
geschlagen worden ist? (Nietzsche 1988, vol. 3: 108–109) 
 
The first thing to notice is that in the so-called “title” of the aphorism, the word 
“subject” appears in quotation marks. It is difficult to say what exactly Nietz-
sche meant by this, but it is obvious that words in quotation marks must be read 
more attentively than words lacking them. On the one hand, by means of these 
quotation marks, Nietzsche seems to refer to a common and wide-spread notion 
of the “subject” from which he wants to take his distance. On the other hand, 
maybe Nietzsche is using quotation marks to point to the fact that “subject” may 
mean many different things depending on the context. The concept of “subject” 
that is used in epistemology and metaphysics is obviously not completely 
identical to the notion used in ethics (see Roden 2004: 93). There are, however, 
similarities and analogies between them – for example, both the epistemological 
and ethical “subject” seem to retain a certain sameness within the plurality of 
experiences, (self)-cognition, acts and deeds. All the same, by placing “subject” 
in quotation marks, Nietzsche is perhaps attempting to convey that this is not 
simply and strictly a Cartesian “subject”, in the sense of a thinking thing 
contrasted with an extended thing, but more like an active and acting “subject” 
that belongs to the realm of ethics and actions. However, to the extent that an 
acting “subject” presumes some form of self-awareness and sameness within a 
plurality of actions, it is not fully distinguishable from a purely perceiving and 
knowing “subject” (as in the theory of knowledge) either. 
The above quote begins in a somewhat Socratic manner – according to 
Nietzsche, people are mostly ignorant about themselves; they do not know 
much about themselves, but this is the very truth that is the most difficult for 
them to grasp, and the one in front of which they close their eyes. They do not 
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know that they do not know anything about themselves yet – not even Socrates, 
as it emerges when one continues to read the quotation: Socrates may have 
claimed to know that he did not know anything; however, about the decisions 
and actions of human beings, above all his own decisions and actions, he 
seemed to think that he knew the most essential part, namely that a good or 
correct course of action follows the right perception or rational deliberation and 
that wrongful deeds only result from ignorance (Plato 1976: 46, Protagoras 
352C)7. As the above quote clearly expresses, according to Nietzsche it is one 
of the most fatal prejudices, the deepest of fallacies, to think this way. Precisely 
this ignorance of oneself (and even more, of course, of everyone else), of which 
one is sadly not yet aware, calls the Socratic view into question, according to 
Nietzsche. In other words, if someone knew significantly more about himself 
than he does now, he would be forced to abandon the Socratic view regarding 
human decisions and actions – this view would turn out to be a mere fable.  
Apparently, Nietzsche means that it is not simply “consciousness” and ratio-
nal deliberation occurring “in it” that guide our decisions and actions to a con-
siderable degree, but something entirely different and unknown, be that the 
differences between various forces and affects, the legacy of the past, processes 
that the consciousness cannot control, etc. Decisions and actions are said to 
never be what they appear at first glance or what we think of them – according 
to Nietzsche, we must accept an “horrific” and inevitable truth: “dass die 
Brücke von der Erkenntniss zur That in keinem einzigen Falle bisher geschla-
gen worden ist” (see also Articles II, III and V). It is the frightfulness of this 
insight that Nietzsche regards as the reason why great thinkers thought the 
opposite was true. Nevertheless, this frightful thought is considered to be the 
naked reality that exposes itself hour after hour. There are numerous other pas-
sages and aphorisms in the works of Nietzsche in which he points to people’s 
ignorance of themselves (and of others) and the constraints of their self-
awareness and self-transparency (see also Article II)8. 
                                                     
7  Cf. Epictetus (1956: 121–123) who seems to have put forth his own version of this 
Socratic view: “If what the philosophers say is true, that in all men thought and action start 
from a single source, namely feeling – as in the case of assent the feeling that a thing is so, 
and in the case of dissent the feeling that it is not so, yes, and, by Zeus, in the case of 
suspended judgement the feeling that it is uncertain, so also in the case of impulse towards a 
thing, the feeling that it is expedient for me and that it is impossible to judge one thing 
expedient and yet desire another, and again, to judge one thing fitting, and yet be impelled to 
another – if all this be true, why are we any longer angry with the multitude? – “They are 
thieves,” says someone, “and robbers.” – What do you mean by “thieves and robbers?” They 
have simply gone astray in questions of good and evil. Ought we, therefore, to be angry with 
them, or rather pity them? Only show them their error and you will see how quickly they 
will desist from their mistakes. But if their eyes are not opened, they have nothing superior 
to their mere opinion.” 
8  Closely related to this aphorism is the immediately preceding one which precisely 
emphasizes the limits of language in self-knowledge and self-awareness, cf.: “Das  
sogenannte  “Ich.”  –  Die Sprache und die Vorurtheile, auf denen die Sprache aufgebaut 
ist, sind uns vielfach in der Ergründung innerer Vorgänge und Triebe hinderlich: zum 
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Therefore, according to Nietzsche, to a significant extent, people’s decisions 
are not led by rational deliberations; on the contrary, without an explicit or even 
definable relationship between these two, people’s decisions and even the 
direction of the rational deliberation in one’s consciousness is determined by 
something that is “imperceptible” or missing, by something that does not pre-
sent itself (see article V).9 It is important to note at this point that Derrida, un-
like Nietzsche or Freud and many others, is careful and even sceptical when 
using the word “unconscious": both consciousness and its antonym “uncon-
sciousness” or “subconsciousness” belong among concepts of metaphysics (cf. 
Derrida 1972: 21–22) that inevitably carry metaphysical connotations which 
Derrida, to the extent that it is possible, seeks to avoid in his work (although he 
admits that this is never fully possible: there can be no genuine exiting from 
metaphysics; even a deconstructive discourse moves on the borderline of 
metaphysics and the domains outside of it). 
Taking into consideration what Nietzsche argues against in the aphorism 
above and using it as a reference point, it is possible to deduce some of the 
characteristics of the “subject” as it is understood in this thesis: “subject” is 
something that knows itself, is capable of rational-intellectual deliberation, and 
according to that deliberation and guided by it, is capable of making free, active 
and autonomous decisions and of taking action. Such a “subject” presumes a 
self-awareness or self-presence in the consciousness (at that, it is important to 
remember that according to Derrida consciousness in its different modifications 
has always implied and signified a self-awareness or a self-presence in the 
consciousness10). This self-presence and self-transparency means a certain 
                                                                                                                                  
Beispiel dadurch, dass eigentlich Worte allein für super la t ivische  Grade dieser Vorgänge 
und Triebe da sind–; nun aber sind wir gewohnt, dort, wo uns Worte fehlen, nicht mehr 
genau zu beobachten, weil es peinlich ist, dort noch genau zu denken; ja, ehedem schloss 
man unwillkürlich, wo das Reich der Worte aufhöre, höre auch das Reich des Daseins auf. 
Zorn, Hass, Liebe, Mitleid, Begehren, Erkennen, Freude, Schmerz,– das sind Alles Namen 
für ext reme Zustände: die milderen mittleren und gar die immerwährend spielenden 
niederen Grade entgehen uns, und doch weben sie gerade das Gespinnst unseres Charakters 
und Schicksals. Jene extremen Ausbrüche – und selbst das mässigste uns  bewusste  
Wohlgefallen oder Missfallen beim Essen einer Speise, beim Hören eines Tones ist 
vielleicht immer noch, richtig abgeschätzt, ein extremer Ausbruch – zerreissen sehr oft das 
Gespinnst und sind dann gewaltthätige Ausnahmen, zumeist wohl in Folge von 
Aufstauungen: – und wie vermögen sie als solche den Beobachter irre zu führen! Nicht 
weniger, als sie den handelnden Menschen in die Irre führen. Wir  s ind  Al le  n icht  Das , 
als was wir nach den Zuständen erscheinen, für die wir allein Bewusstsein und Worte – und 
folglich Lob und Tadel – haben; wir verkennen uns nach diesen gröberen Ausbrüchen, die 
uns allein bekannt werden, wir machen einen Schluss aus einem Material, in welchem die 
Ausnahmen die Regel überwiegen, wir verlesen uns in dieser scheinbar deutlichsten 
Buchstabenschrift unseres Selbst. Unsere  Meinung über  uns  aber, die wir auf diesem 
falschen Wege gefunden haben, das sogenannte “Ich”, arbeitet fürderhin mit an unserem 
Charakter und Schicksal.–” (Nietzsche 1988, vol. 3: 107–108) 
9  Cf. Nietzsche 2011. 
10 Cf. Derrida 1972: 17: “Que veut dire « conscience »? Le plus souvent dans la forme 
même du « vouloir-dire », elle ne se donne à penser, sous toutes ses modifications, que 
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identification of the “subject” with itself – the presence of the desires, thoughts, 
wants, intentions and rational deliberation of the decision-maker to himself. If 
the correct (self-)knowledge has been reached with the help of rational delibe-
ration – for example, what one wants, whether the desired objective is a good 
thing, how it can be achieved, what the positive and negative consequences of it 
are and what the risks potentially involved are – then, in standard everyday 
situations, a decision is made based on, and resulting from, this knowledge. 
However, if we undermine the authority of consciousness, of the self-presence 
of consciousness as a “subject”, as Nietzsche and Derrida have done from dif-
ferent facets, then the existence of such an autonomous, self-aware and rational 
“subject” immediately becomes questionable. For example, in his article 
Différance, where Derrida refers to none other than Nietzsche as his prede-
cessor, he writes the following about consciousness: 
 
On en vient donc à poser la présence — et singulièrement la conscience, l’être 
auprès de soi de la conscience — non plus comme la forme matricielle absolue 
de l’être mais comme une « détermination » et comme un « effet ». Déter-
mination ou effet à l’intérieur d’un système qui n’est plus celui de la présence 
mais celui de la différance […]. […] je rappellerai seulement que pour Nietzsche 
«la grande activité principale est inconsciente » et que la conscience est l’effet de 
forces dont l’essence et les voies et les modes ne lui sont pas propres. Or la force 
elle-même n’est jamais présente: elle n’est qu’un jeu de différences et de 
quantités. (Derrida 1972: 17) 
 
Therefore, consciousness is not an absolute form of existence in either 
Nietzsche’s or Derrida’s thinking; in other words, it is not the absolute origin of 
thoughts, decisions and actions, but more of an effect or consequence of a 
certain “system”. Derrida gives several “names” to what comprises this system; 
the best known among them – and the one that was mentioned in the previous 
quote – is différance, which Derrida described elsewhere as the “disappearance 
of any originary presence” (Derrida 1981: 168). Something – a sign, a thought 
or an intention – is present only insofar as it is different from something else, 
which means that it is never simply present: it carries traces of differences in 
itself which have never been nor ever will be present. On the one hand, diffé-
rance creates an appearance of the “subject” as self-presence (see Article II); 
on the other, it is precisely that which undermines this subject and makes it 
impossible as such. Hence, différance and other similar nominal effects are one 
of the main reasons why the “subject” (as an identity and a consciousness) must 
be reinterpreted and resituated (cf. Lumsden 2007: 38)11. 
                                                                                                                                  
comme présence à soi, perception de soi de la présence. Et ce qui vaut de la conscience vaut 
ici de l’existence dite subjective en général. De même que la catégorie du sujet ne peut et n’a 
jamais pu se penser sans la référence à la présence comme upokeimenon ou comme ousia, 
etc., de même le sujet comme conscience n’a jamais pu s’annoncer autrement que comme 
présence à soi.” 
11  For example in Positions, Derrida (2004: 25) writes the following: “[...] the subject, and 
first of all the conscious and speaking subject, depends upon the system of differences and 
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Naturally, this does not mean that consciousness loses all meaning or that a 
person is incapable of rational and conscious deliberation; the problem is rather 
that this deliberation lacks the meaning and autonomy that has been attributed 
to it until now. Consciousness is not only an effect of something that is not 
present; a deliberation born of it is not simply contaminated by something “non-
present", but according to Nietzsche and Derrida, since that deliberation is also 
always linguistic in the broadest sense of the word (as is the entire “conscious-
ness“), it is consequently and in “essence” also something general (linguistic 
signs form a system of differences and can be repeated endlessly by all); as 
such, it is completely non-individualistic. Therefore, it should be asked how 
autonomous and binding (and present to some singularity) a deliberation born 
and conducted in consciousness could be and what kind of role and importance 
it would play in decision-making. As previously mentioned, precisely this 
authority of self-presence and the subversion of “subjectness” based on it forms 
the main topic of Articles II, III and V. 
 
b. Sameness and Autonomy 
 
However, identity should not only and strictly be considered a self-presence in 
self-awareness. Equally important to this study is identity as a more or less 
constant set or disposition of characteristics. “Subject”, in the senses of both 
self-presence and firm disposition, is something that remains the same under-
neath the plurality of experiences and actions. But self-presence as such is not 
necessarily required for identity. These two ways of understanding identity are 
still interconnected, since people themselves (or cultures, nationalities, com-
munities etc.), for example, can fight for their certain identity, talk about their 
character or disposition only if they are aware of it to some extent; nevertheless, 
the emphasis here is not on being aware of it. For example, in this context 
Aristotle speaks about hexis or firm and fixed disposition. It should be briefly 
mentioned that this constant disposition forms the basis for the most basic 
concept of Aristotle’s ethics – “virtue” or “excellence". Nietzsche and Derrida 
obviously do not wish to deny that a person can have a more or less constant 
character or attitude; however, they do relativize this constancy to a significant 
degree – it is always possible (and not simply as a chance or an aberration) that 
the person will act contrary to their supposedly constant attitude. As was 
previously seen, the identity of a “subject” is not closed in itself: it is open, it is 
pierced, it has gaps and holes, there is always some “other” abiding in it. For 
example, Derrida remarks in one of his interviews that “people who fight for 
their identity must pay attention to the fact that identity is not the self-identity of 
a thing – for instance, this glass, this microphone – but implies a difference 
within identity” (Derrida 1997: 13), continuing his train of thought thusly: “In 
the case of culture, person, nation, language, identity is a self-differentiating 
                                                                                                                                  
the movement of différance, [...] the subject is constituted only in being divided from itself, 
in becoming space, in temporizing, in deferral.” 
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identity, an identity different from itself, having an opening or gap within it-
self.” (Derrida 1997: 13) This inevitability of the other or others in “sameness”, 
this duplication of a person is, among other things, related to the teeming and 
exuberant diversity of an historical or genealogical legacy and heritage. Michel 
Foucault describes this state of affairs from the point of view of a person 
researching genealogy or historical origins: 
 
Where the soul pretends unification or the Me fabricates a coherent identity, the 
genealogist sets out to study the beginning – numberless beginnings, whose faint 
traces and hints of colour are readily seen by an historical eye. The analysis of 
descent permits the dissociation of the Me, its recognition and displacement as 
an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events [l’analyse de la 
provenance permet de dissocier le Moi et de faire pulluler, aux lieux et places de 
sa synthèse vide, mille événements maintenant perdus]. (Foucault 1998: 374) 
 
Because the I as a synthesis and a unity has been formed from the diversity of 
incomprehensible historical heritage, which among other things apparently 
includes confrontations, incompatibilities, conflicts, etc., then the synthesised 
unity of the I (therefore a certain constant character or nature) could crumble 
and collapse at any moment. The important aspect here is the certain inevitable 
possibility of crumbling. But this does not mean that Derrida would like to 
destroy all sorts of unity; on the contrary, he says that we do need a certain 
unity, but he is interested in the inevitable and necessary border or limit of any 
attempt at unification and homogenization (Derrida 1997: 13). 
Therefore, such a traditional “subject” also denies historicity. Let us consider 
this more closely. An exhaustive and detailed consideration of historicity casts 
doubt not only, of course, on the identity of the “subject”, but also (and now 
from a slightly different angle) on the autonomy of decisions and actions 
(identity and autonomy are interrelated). Consisting of certain sequential now-
moments that are separated from each other, such a “subject” should be able to 
freely deliberate on any given now-moment and make a decision according to 
this deliberation (and / or following its own nature). However, taking into 
account that a person – including the directions of their deliberations and pos-
sible decisions – is mainly defined by his or her historical legacy, this autonomy 
becomes questionable (cf. Diprose 2006: 438). According to both Nietzsche and 
Derrida, such a “subject” itself (or the appearance of such a “subject“) is born of 
contingent historical development. 
In his On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche demonstrates that the idea of 
the “free will” of a “subject” and of its capacity to make decisions and take 
responsibility is partly produced and perpetuated by a set of historical processes 
which he calls a “slave revolt in morality” (for a thorough discussion of this, see 
Article VI). To put it concisely, this event is a victory over aristocratic values 
achieved by values belonging to lower classes and to the priesthood.12 It is in 
the course of this event that the idea of there being an independent agent behind 
                                                     
12  Cf. Nietzsche 2007: 60–61. 
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decisions and actions, a “subject” who can choose whether and how to act 
(Nietzsche 1988, vol. 5: 279) is perpetuated – the roots of which are hidden in 
the subject-predicate structure of language itself. In the same work, Nietzsche 
implies that primitive and cruel social punishment systems as a sort of memory 
technique (such as breaking on a wheel or stoning to death) have ingrained 
certain social and moral norms into people’s memories by defining the permis-
sible and impermissible that guide the actions of an agent without the latter 
being really aware of it (cf. Diprose 2006: 438). However, if the decision-maker 
or agent is indeed largely defined by complex and diverse historical legacies or 
inheritance, then how is it possible to talk about autonomy in a rigorous sense, 
take decisions and responsibility? The convergence of different historical 
legacies in the decision-maker, its placement in and its “being thrown” into a 
certain historical context or reality that defines him and that he is not able to 
control significantly undermines any kind of autonomy (whether it is based on 
rationality or will).13 
But in his On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche also speaks of a sovereign 
and autonomous individual who is capable of making promises and decisions 
and taking responsibility for them (see Article IV). This individual is supposed 
to have been indeed genealogically produced and shaped by morality of custom 
(Sittlichkeit der Sitte) or by moral discipline but, as the last stage of develop-
ment, has now shaken off this morality (Nietzsche uses the word übersittlich) 
and become independent of it. As such, autonomy or sovereignty14 does not 
seem to be completely compatible with the rest of Nietzsche’s thinking, and 
various interpreters have attributed different meanings to it: for example, it is 
either something that Nietzsche truly considers possible or indeed real in its 
purest form (cf. Diprose 2006), or an unattainable ideal, hyperbole, allegory or 
simply something that does not make much sense (Angier 2006, see also article 
IV). This enquiry supports the view that in describing sovereignty Nietzsche 
makes use of hyperbole as a literary device or strategy: ultimately such an 
historically developed sovereignty must still be understood as something highly 
unstable, historically placed and heteronomous. This perspective is the most 
compatible with other aspects of Nietzsche’s thinking. However, if a sovereign 
individual is indeed interpreted as something that Nietzsche considers possible 
or something that actually exists – in other words, if its description in On the 
Genealogy of Morals is understood verbatim, as Rosalyn Diprose (2006: 439) 
seems to have done – then Derrida naturally would not be able to agree with 
Nietzsche on this issue: for him, such sovereignty and autonomy would be yet 
another fictional idea. A human being, as Diprose (2006: 439) correctly notes, is 
never completely sovereign and self-present according to Derrida: he is 
completely (using Heidegger’s terminology) finite and “heteronomous” due to 
                                                     
13  Cf. Lumsden 2007: 39: “The disparate sources that make up one’s subjectivity are never 
merely mine, they are delivered to me; they are not caused by me and they cannot reflect 
some inner essence.” 
14  By sovereignty is meant freedom from external control; in this sense, the meaning in 
which it is used here is very close to that of autonomy. 
21 
his or her “being-thrown” (see Heidegger 1986). On historical legacy or rather 
inheritance and the finiteness and being-finite of human beings, Derrida notes 
the following: 
 
Only a finite being inherits and his finitude obliges him. It obliges him to receive 
what is larger and older and more powerful and more durable than he. But the 
same finitude obliges one to choose, to prefer, to sacrifice, to exclude, to let go 
and leave behind. (Derrida and Roudinesco 2004: 5) 
 
This quote is important because the necessity of selection, preference, sacrifice 
and exclusion that is conditioned by the finiteness of humans should not be 
understood as a sovereign act by an autonomous “subject” as has been done 
traditionally, but instead as based on a certain “passivity” and “heteronomy”15 
(see also Article I). Due to the finiteness of humans, every human being ex-
presses his or her legacy in idiosyncratic or individual ways, but the manner of 
self-expression, or rather how it is expressed in an individual, is not governed 
by his or her autonomous decision. And this brings us to a very important 
distinction between Nietzsche and Derrida: even if a “sovereign individual” is 
also something rather conditional and relative, Nietzsche still understands 
responsibility (and implicitly also decision) from the point of view of 
sovereignty and autonomy in his On the Genealogy of Morals. As Nietzsche 
explicitly states therein: only a sovereign individual has this “stolze Wissen um 
das ausserordentliche Privilegium der Verantwortl ichkeit , das Bewusstsein 
dieser seltenen Freiheit, dieser Macht über sich” (Nietzsche 1988, vol. 5: 294). 
This means that to the extent that Nietzsche undermines autonomy and sove-
reignty, he also seems to undermine the concepts of decision and responsibility; 
if autonomy proves to be conditional when analysed more thoroughly, then a 
decision could only be conditional and limited as well – in other words, he does 
not attempt or consider it necessary to develop an alternative which would 
separate responsibility and decision from autonomy. For Nietzsche, decision (at 
least implicitly) and responsibility, to the extent that and within the limits in 
which they are possible, must be based on a certain more or less conditional and 
relative sovereignty. Derrida, on the contrary, as thoroughly demonstrated in 
Article I, understands decision from completely different, almost opposite 
preconditions. Namely, Derrida does not only deconstruct, undermine and 
relativize the presumed unity, autonomy and identity of the “subject”, but also 
points to a peculiar matter of fact which is quite essential as well (see also 
Article I) – that even if such a calculating and calculable “subject” with an 
autonomous and constant identity truly existed, i.e. if a “subject” was indeed 
what it claimed to be or what it was thought to be, then in principle it would 
                                                     
15 It should nevertheless be borne in mind that, according to Derrida, decision is not purely 
and simply heteronomous or passive as opposed to autonomy and activity. Rather, it hovers 
somewhere between passivity and activity, heteronomy and autonomy. For this reason, I 
have placed these words in quotation marks. 
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nevertheless be unable to make a decision. Hence, Derrida writes in Politiques 
de l’amitié: 
 
Sans doute la subjectivité d’un sujet, déjà, ne décide-t-elle jamais de rien ; son 
identité à soi et sa permanence calculable font de toute décision un accident qui 
laisse le sujet indifférent. Une théorie du sujet est incapable de rendre compte de 
la moindre décision. Mais cela doit se dire a fortiori de l’événement, et de 
l’événement au regard de la décision. Car si rien n’arrive jamais à un sujet, rien 
qui mérite le nom d’événement, le schème de la décision tend régulièrement, du 
moins dans son acception commune et hégémonique (celle qui semble dominer 
encore le décisionnisme schmittien, sa théorie de l’exception et de la souve-
raineté), à impliquer l’instance du sujet, d’un sujet classique, libre et volontaire, 
donc d’un sujet auquel rien n’arrive, pas même l’événement singulier dont il 
croit, par exemple en situation d’exception, prendre et garder l’initiative. 
(Derrida 1994: 87) 16 
 
From this it is possible to deduce that the deconstruction of the unity and 
identity of the “subject” performed by Derrida is not merely a neutral descrip-
tion of the state of affairs, but possesses a certain ethical or normative di-
mension as well. In the words of Derrida himself: “That is why I insisted on 
what prevents unity from closing upon itself, from being closed up. This is not 
only a matter of description, of saying that this is the way it is. It is a matter of 
accounting for the possibility of responsibility, of a decision, of ethical commit-
ments.” (Derrida 1997: 13) The problem regarding why such a previously 
described “subject” could not make decisions (or would necessarily remain 
irresponsible) according to Derrida is explained and treated in more detail and 
with accompanying examples in Article I. 
 
c. Aristotle’s Concept of Decision and the “Subject” 
 
The “subject”, as it is understood in this paper, is therefore characterized by a 
certain self-awareness and self-presence (in consciousness), by a rationality that 
guides action and thought, by identity (“subject” is largely the same underneath 
the plurality of actions and experiences), freedom, activeness and autonomy. 
Aristotle’s concept of decision presumes, more or less explicitly, all these 
characteristics of the “subject”. Even though Aristotle does not have a single 
term for either “subject” or “consciousness” and even if he does not share many 
problems that are associated with the concepts of “consciousness” and “subject” 
in modern times (such as Cartesian indubitability), that does not mean that 
                                                     
16  Cf. also Derrida 1999: 23–24: “Does one have the right to give this name ‘decision’ to a 
purely autonomous movement […] which would proceed only from me, myself, and would 
merely deploy the possibilities of a subjectivity that was mine? Would we not be justified in 
seeing here the unfolding of an egological immanence, the autonominal and automatic 
deployment of the predicates or possibilities proper to a subject, without that tearing that 
ought to advene in any so-called free decision?” 
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Aristotle was unaware of the phenomenon that we call “consciousness” or 
“subjectivity” (see also Caston 2002) or that he did not presuppose properties 
that characterize the “subject”. (In relation to consciousness, the most important 
fact in this context is that a rational deliberation is something conscious, 
something that one is aware of17, and that the deliberator and decision-maker is 
aware of himself as a decision-maker (knows who he is, knows himself) and of 
the details and circumstances of the decision – and Aristotle seems to agree with 
this explicitly.) Article I thoroughly analyses Aristotle’s concept of decision and 
the problems related to it. To summarize it here, it is possible to say that 
Aristotle understands decision as a phenomenon through which an individual 
becomes the initiator or the author of his or her own action. But how does he 
understand decision (prohairesis) itself? According to Aristotle, a decision is 
something voluntary (hekôn); the voluntary is defined in Book 3 of Nico-
machean Ethics as follows: “What is voluntary seems to be what has its origin 
in the agent himself when he knows the particulars that the action consists in” 
(Aristotle 1985: 58, NE 1111a22–24; cf. Aristotle 1984: 1941, EE 1225b1–
b10). Those particulars or details that form the prerequisites of voluntariness 
and, therefore, of the decision itself are: (1) who decides; (2) what his or her 
action will be or what he is doing; (3) what the object of that action is; (4) 
means of action; (5) purpose of action; and (6) manner of action (whether it is 
done calmly or quickly). Now, if one of these particulars or details (and, as 
Aristotle adds, especially the most important one of those – namely the second 
one, what one is doing) remains unknown, then the action is no longer some-
thing voluntary and therefore cannot be considered a decision. It is noteworthy 
that Aristotle considers it necessary to point out and highlight that “certainly 
someone could not be ignorant of all of these unless he were mad [my em-
phasis, J.S.]. Nor, clearly, could he be ignorant of who is doing it, since he 
could hardly be ignorant of himself.” (Aristotle 1985: 57; NE 1111a6–8) 
However, according to Aristotle, a decision is not simply something volun-
tary; it is said to be a voluntary act that is strictly related to rational delibe-
ration – that is guided by thorough rational deliberation. Nevertheless, a certain 
motivating force joins rational deliberation because Aristotle defines decision-
making in his Nicomachean Ethics as a “deliberative desire to do an action that 
is up to us” (Aristotle 1985: 64; NE 1113a10–12). According to this quotation, a 
decision has a double origin: on the one hand, it derives from irrational pursuits 
or from a striving and motivating force (orexis), in Kuhn’s (1960) words, from 
the darkness of the irrational; on the other hand, from the clarity of rationality, 
from rational deliberation. However, Aristotle completely subjects this 
                                                     
17  For example in Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle states quite explicitly: “Now someone who 
sees perceives that he sees; one who hears perceives that he hears; and one who walks 
perceives that he walks. Similarly in the other cases also there is some [element] that 
perceives that we are active. Hence, if we are perceiving, we perceive that we are perceiving; 
and if we are understanding, we perceive that we are understanding.” (Aristotle 1985: 260; 
NE a29–b1). – Regarding Aristotle’s treatment of problems related to consciousness, see 
Caston 2002. 
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endeavouring irrational force to rational deliberation; this force strives and 
motivates according to this deliberation and under its guidance. Due to this, 
Aristotle subjects decisions to rational deliberation, whereas a decision-maker is 
aware of and perceives himself as a decision-maker and also what he does, why 
he does it, etc.18 Such an approach to decision undoubtedly belongs to or under 
the thing against which Nietzsche argues in his aphorism Die unbekannte Welt 
des “Subjects”, which was our starting point for the topic of the characteristics 
and deconstruction of “subject”. He does not name Aristotle in it (although 
Plato and Socrates are mentioned) but does say “so dachte ehemals Jeder, so 
denkt fast noch Jeder”. 
Finally, regarding decision, one more thing is important to Aristotle: namely 
the constant disposition or certain identity. Decision-making is not simply 
guided by rational deliberation, but is also based on a steadfast disposition 
(hexis), character or stable identity (as a constant sameness) which is acquired 
as a result of upbringing and long training and repetition. According to Aris-
totle, in some instances a decision automatically stems from disposition. 
Although Aristotle unites these two approaches in his thinking, a certain tension 
and irreconcilability can be observed between them (see Article I). 
Nietzsche and Derrida deconstruct and undermine all of the abovementioned 
characteristics of the “subject”, which, as previously said, does not mean that 
they negate a certain self-awareness or the possibility of rational deliberation 
taking place in consciousness or the existence of a relative identity. Their 
criticism only limits (even if to a significant extent) the authority of conscious-
ness, autonomy and rationality: consciousness and rationality are no longer 
considered to be an absolute form of existence but more an effect, just as the 
identity of a decision-maker reveals itself to be more relative than before. It 
                                                     
18  It may nevertheless seem that Aristotle, when he goes on to analyse acrasy and acratic, 
still allows for the possibility that decision and deed do not always follow rational 
deliberation. Insofar as Aristotle seems to recognize deviant cases where right rational 
deliberation is not followed by right deed – although here it should be emphasized that 
according to Nietzsche and Derrida it would not be a deviance but normality – he is 
apparently, and at least to some extent, critical of the Socratic view. According to Aristotle, 
acrasy appears when a person in a certain situation does know what is right, but acts 
nevertheless wrongly; for example, leading a bad life. Aristotle himself notes in Nico-
machean Ethics that although Socrates thought that acrasy never occured, this seems to be 
contradictory to the experience which appears to confirm its reality (Aristoteles 1985: 174–
175; NE 1145b25–29). In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle offers four solutions to the problem 
of acrasy and acratic, but as Richard Robinson has shown very convincingly, all four seem 
to boil down to the claim that knowledge found through deliberation is not completely and 
actually present in the mind or reason of the acratic – the acratic may potentially know what 
should be done or what is the right thing to do, but this knowledge is not active at the 
moment of the deed. Robinson writes thus: “For in my view every one of the four solutions 
amounts to saying that the acratic, at the time of his act, does not have fully in mind all the 
parts of the practical syllogism that ought to govern it.” (Robinson 1995: 195) Thus Aristotle 
does seem to agree with Plato and Socrates that what leads human decisions and actions is 
knowledge, rational clarity achieved by rational deliberation. There is indeed some sort of 
acrasy, but in such cases this knowledge is simply not active. 
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should be emphasised at this point that Derrida does not understand his “de-
construction” as irrationality, but rather as a modern form of rationality – one 
that includes everything that previous forms of rationality sought to exclude 
from the realm of rationality. If contemporary rationalism wants to provide an 
adequate description of the modern world, then it must in one way or another 
take into consideration the so-called “discoveries” which have been made in 
psychoanalysis, for example – while not abandoning a critical and careful 
stance toward its ultimate self-comprehension. 
It is not only Aristotle’s approach to decision that in some way presumes the 
“subject” delineated above, or at least a part of the characteristics of this “sub-
ject”. Next, we will consider the sense in which this study understands Aris-
totle’s approach to be the so-called traditional and widespread one, and the one 




4. TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF DECISION 
Let us thus consider why Aristotle’s approach to decision-making is called the 
traditional one in this thesis and to what the phrase “Aristotelian conceptua-
lization of decision” used in the thesis refers. This study claims that Aristotle 
presents a certain general framework that captures a large part or even the 
majority of later approaches to decision. Even if these later approaches differ 
from Aristotle’s approach considerably or even sharply in some respects, they 
still hold important and “inherent” components of his conception and themati-
zation. By the general framework are mostly meant the two pillars of Aristotle’s 
approach that were pointed out earlier: firstly, he understands decision as 
something based on rational deliberation and guided by it; secondly, he under-
stands decision as based on a constant disposition that has been acquired 
through training and upbringing (like, for example, on virtue which, to simplify, 
is a good and valuable disposition). Aristotle seems to have wanted to combine 
these two pillars into one complete theory in his ethics, even though, as pre-
viously mentioned, a certain tension can be seen here. Later, these two pillars 
seem to diverge even further in different treatments, so that at least to a certain 
degree (and in certain treatments) they will become mutually exclusive.19 Now, 
the majority of later approaches to decision, which are quite often presented 
implicitly within a more general theory of morals and actions, are based on one 
or the other of these two pillars. 
 
a. Decision and Rationality 
 
The Aristotelian approach that a decision is made after lengthy rational delibe-
ration and based on knowledge and information acquired through it – that in 
some sense a decision results from rational deliberation and is subordinate to 
it – is so widespread that it seems self-evident. It is thought that people deli-
berate on what they should do, analyse their goals and means to achieve them 
and make decisions based on the knowledge acquired through and according to 
this deliberation. The same is thought to happen with political decisions that 
concern entire countries and nations and that could dictate war or peace. 
Nowadays, such a view seems obvious in both the everyday and the philo-
sophical sense, and seems to have been self-evident for the larger part of the 
history of philosophy. Now, differences between various rationalistic ap-
proaches become evident when attempts are made to determine, in a more exact 
and subtle manner, what is meant by reason (when, for example, practical and 
                                                     
19  Of course, one could also name as one of those pillars activity, voluntariness or freedom, 
which Aristotle’s conception likewise presupposes (as, of course, do most later conceptions). 
However, I will confine myself to the two pillars mentioned above. Besides, in most ratio-
nalistic treatments of decision, a certain voluntariness is already an inseparable and neces-
sary component, although there are conceptions which emphasize radical freedom without 
being rationalistic (see below, footnote no. 20). 
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theoretical reason are differentiated, as by Immanuel Kant), what is meant by 
grounds, what can be deliberated, whether reason uses another motivating force 
to make a decision or take action such as it is explicitly meant by Aristotle, or 
whether reason itself possesses such a force, etc. However, all of these diffe-
rences accept a certain conceptual minimum, according to which rational 
deliberation performed by the rational “subject” is the very basis of decision. 
In what follows, I will provide some examples of rationalistic theories of 
decision in order to show that despite all of the differences, a certain conceptual 
minimum is shared by them. One of the most faithful and influential proponents 
and supporters of Aristotelian views in the Middle Ages was Thomas Aquinas. 
He also makes some subtle distinctions regarding deed and motivation. Ac-
cording to Aquinas, a deed emerges in a rather complicated interaction between 
reason or intellect and will (voluntas). One of the components or factors of this 
interaction is precisely decision or choice (electio). Herewith arises the question 
for Aquinas as to whether choice belongs to the realm of intellect and rational 
deliberation or that of the will, because he says that “the term ‘election’ implies 
a quality of reason or intellect and a quality of will; Aristotle refers to it being 
both understanding as desirous and desire as understanding” (Aquinas 2006: 
125). But the will itself had already been defined by Aquinas as something 
rational, namely rational desire (appetitus intellectualis or rationalis) in op-
position to natural and animal desire (Aquinas 2006a: 159–161). And as a 
rational desire, the will obeys (at least in most cases and as normality) the 
commands of reason, follows its superior guidance. In this sense one could 
claim that it does not really matter whether Aquinas imputes choice to will or 
reason, as it has already been submitted to a certain rationality. And eventually 
Aquinas indeed seeks to understand choice as rather belonging to the will, as an 
act of will. This rather is important here; Aquinas tries to explain his idea with 
the help of Aristotle’s distinction between “material” and “formal” cause by 
writing in Summa Theologiae: 
 
It is clear that reason comes before will and directs its activity, in that the will 
tends towards its object in the setting of reason, which presents to it the object of 
desire. Accordingly then, that will-act which turns towards an object proposed to 
it as being good, that is, as being reasonably subordinate to the end, is ‘mate-
rially’ one of will, but formally one of reason. [...] In this sense choice is sub-
stantially an act of will, not of reason [...]. (Aquinas 2006: 125) 
 
One can thus read from the quotation that choice does substantially (substantia-
liter) belong to the will, which is described as the “material” cause of choice, 
but on the other hand it is itself guided by reason or intellect as the “formal” 
cause of choice. One might indeed form the impression that it has to do here 
with a certain double rationality: the will as rational desire is guided by reason. 
But this, as alluded above, could perhaps be understood in such a way that since 
the will is rational desire, it is also guided and steered by reason (about the 
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intellectualism of Aquinas, cf. also Williams 2012: 203–204; Hause 1997: 
16820).21 
In modern times, moral rationalism, for example, has figured prominently 
and still has many influential proponents today. Also, this movement seems to 
implicitly (and in some cases explicitly) include a rationalistic conception of 
decision. Moral rationalism, understood here as a view according to which 
morals are based on reason or rationality, leading to the most general claim that 
moral truths, permissible and forbidden, can be known mostly or only through 
reason, often attributes to reason in its many forms (or knowledge found 
through reason about what should be done) not only a leading but also a moti-
vating and impellent force (see Nichols 2002). For example, Leibniz, whose 
thinking is in many ways similar to that of Aristotle (cf. Roinila 2007: 161–
165), writes in one of his later comments on his A New Method for Learning 
and Teaching Jurisprudence (1667): “To will is nothing but the striving arising 
from thought, or to strive for something which our thinking recognizes as good” 
(Leibniz 1989: 91).22 According to this quote, a striving and motivating force 
seems to arise from thinking itself. On the one hand, it is not identical to 
Aristotle’s thinking; as became apparent, according to him, a decision also 
requires a certain irrational motivating force, but since he completely sub-
ordinates this force to reason, both his and Leibniz’s approach form part of the 
same rationalistic framework. Leibniz seems to have accepted Aristotelian pre-
sumptions and then taken one step further. However, on the other hand, Leib-
niz’s extreme rationalism is already implicitly present in Aristotle’s thinking 
(see also Article I, especially concerning the connection between practical syl-
logism and action). 
As already mentioned, different forms of moral rationalism still have many 
followers, for example, Christine Korsgaard (1986) and Michael Smith (1994, 
                                                     
20  One possible counter-reading of Aquinas which puts more emphasis on the independence 
and freedom of the will is offered by Kristinson 2006. 
21  Yet it seems that in the Middle Ages Aristotle was not read only in light of Thomas 
Aquinas; for example Duns Scotus (1266–1308) and other “voluntarists” read him under the 
influence of St. Augustine, since they emphasized first and foremost the radical freedom and 
independency of the will (Alanen 2003: 208–235; Alanen 2009: 91–92). (As is demonstrated 
in the study (cf. Article I), the Aristotelian account of decision also presupposes a certain 
voluntariness.) According to them, the will is not determined by reason. This kind of view, 
which does not lean on either of the Aristotelian pillars mentioned above, implies a 
conception of decision which is no longer based on rationality. However, on the basis of this 
“freedom”, even this conceptualization could in some sense be called Aristotelian, albeit not 
rationalistic. 
22  This is somewhat similar to what Descartes (2008:41) has to say regarding the will and 
motivation in his Meditations: “[…] it [the will] consists purely in this: that we are moved in 
relation to that which the intellect presents to us as to be affirmed or denied, pursued or 
avoided, in such a way that we feel we are not being determined in that direction by any 
external force. For, in order to be free, I do not have to be able to be moved in either 
direction. On the contrary, the more I incline to one alternative, whether because I clearly 
understand that the good and the true are on that side, or because God so disposes my 
innermost thoughts.” 
29 
1997); although some of its critics have asked whether psychopaths are not an 
expressive counterargument to such moral rationalism: their intellect seems to 
be sharp, they seem to clearly know what to do and what to avoid, their rational 
deliberation seems to be correct and resemble that of people who are sane, and 
yet it does not motivate them; for some reason, they do not follow this 
awareness in their decisions and actions; or, in other words, it is not actualized 
or expressed in their behaviour and actions. And even when their moral 
deliberation is faulty (for which there is some support), then this deficiency 
seems to have little to do with their rational capabilities and more with their 
affective system (see Nichols 2002). 
One of the most explicit and detailed rationalistic conceptions of decision 
today has been offered by Julian Nida-Rümelin. According to him, decision is 
based on rational deliberation and calculation of grounds: “Die rationale Person 
lässt ihr Urteilen und Handeln von praktischen wie theoretischen Gründen 
leiten. […] Sie entscheidet sich gegen eine Handlungsoption, wenn die Ab-
wägung praktischer Gründe negativ ausfällt […].” (Nida-Rümelin 2005: 48) 
Here is given a certain general rationalistic description of decision to which 
probably every rationalistic conception of decision would subscribe. But at least 
on the basis of one passage it seems that he also (and somewhat similarly to 
Leibniz) seeks to go even further than that: he seems to refer to the fact that 
decision itself really is the immediate result of rational deliberation. When, 
namely, the taking of decision is imminent, the expectations that the decision-
maker may have regarding his own decision make, in Rümelin’s words, no 
sense. Precisely in this context he writes: 
 
Dann sind die Bedingungen der Entscheidungsfindung klar: entweder sind sie 
dergestalt, dass das Ergebnis der Abwägung von Gründen schon festliegt – dann 
ist die Entscheidung schon getroffen –, oder das Ergebnis der Abwägung ist trotz 
Kenntnis der Entscheidungsbedingungen noch offen. Dann machen auch Er-
wartungen hinsichtlich des Ergebnisses keinen Sinn. (Nida-Rümelin 2005: 50–
51) 
 
Decision, as in moral rationalism described before, is almost entirely reduced to 
rational deliberation, or more precisely still to its result. Decision as a pheno-
menon seems to lose all independence and specificity. As mentioned before, 
something similar can even be seen in Aristotle’s conception, namely regarding 
his practical syllogism. It is therefore not only a pure accident or coincidence 
that Nida-Rümelin, aiming to explain his treatment, refers explicitly to Aristotle 
(Rümelin 2005: 55). 
Now, there is no doubt that there are considerable and evident differences 
between different rationalistic concepts of decision, regardless of whether those 
concepts are explicit or can be found implicitly in some theory of morals and 
action. But that a decision is preceded by rational deliberation, that it is itself 
based on it, guided by it and in some way results from such deliberation, seems 
to be a conceptual minimum to which all rationalistic conceptions would 
subscribe. Such a conceptualization of decision seems to be so self-evident and 
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dominating in philosophy (but certainly not only and not even first and foremost 
in philosophy) that even in e.g. the general dictionary of philosophical termi-
nology Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe decision is thematized in a 
similar fashion, thereby referring to Aristotle. Here is the quote: 
 
Entscheidung (lat. decisio, engl. decision), einer Handlung unmittelbar vorher-
gehender Entschluss zwischen Handlungsalternativen, wobei die kleinste 
Alternativenmenge die ist, entweder eine bestimmte Tätigkeit auszuführen oder 
untätig zu bleiben. In diesem Sinne der “Wahl“, jedoch mit deutlicher Betonung 
von Vernunft, Denken, Überlegung, bestimmt schon Aristoteles die Ent-
scheidung […]. (Regenbogen & Meyer 1998: 186) 
 
As can be seen from the quotation, decision is defined through the German 
word “Entschluss” (which could also be translated into other languages as 
“decision”), about which one reads the following in the same dictionary: “Ent-
schluss oder Entschliessung, der Abschluss des Erwägens zwischen mehreren 
Möglichkeiten des Handelns” (Regenbogen & Meyer 1998a: 188). Decision is 
thus described here not as a result of deliberation but somewhat more cautiously 
as its end (although in certain contexts the word Abschluss could also mean 
“conclusion” or even “result” (Ergebniss)). In any case, this definition of 
decision no doubt belongs to the same rational framework as Rümelin’s and 
other conceptions analyzed above, and therefore also accepts the same con-
ceptual minimum. 
 
b. Decision, Fixed Disposition and Virtue 
 
From the moral rationalism and rationalistic conceptions of decision described 
above, which emphasize the importance and role of rationality and rational 
deliberation in taking (moral) decisions, various forms of so-called virtue ethics 
can be differentiated which have become very influential, especially in the 20th 
century. For such theories, what is most important in estimating an act or deed 
is acquired character23 and not some kind of rational rule or deliberation which 
preceded it. Also, this view can be seen as belonging to the Aristotelian frame-
work, which, as demonstrated above, is based on two pillars or cornerstones: 
rational deliberation and firm or constant character. According to virtue ethics, 
the goodness or rightness of a deed is mostly guaranteed by good firm dis-
position or character (virtue) which, due to its relative permanence, could also 
be called a certain identity. Good character that can be formed and developed 
through upbringing, education and training is understood as the basis of good 
deeds. Such a view includes the general idea that if a person has acquired a 
good character or virtue then he will also make good decisions, which in some 
                                                     
23  Also the rationalistic theories of ethics can, of course, speak about virtues (and normally 
they do), but virtues play there a secondary role, they are clearly submitted to rational 
deliberation and principles. 
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sense follow from his disposition more or less automatically or naturally, and in 
some sense even unconsciously, thus not needing complicated rational deli-
beration or rules24. Various forms of virtue ethics do not, of course, deny 
rational deliberation (which can help, for example, in finding the right means to 
achieve a certain goal), but it is not central, since the motivation to decide on 
something is seen to come from (firm and constant) character. A courageous or 
brave person takes courageous decisions not because of rational deliberation or 
rule (to maximize one’s utility, for example), but because he has required 
through rigorous education, upbringing and training such a character which 
naturally realizes and expresses itself in the deed. 
If one were to interpret David Hume in terms of virtue ethics, which has 
often been done (cf. Hursthouse 1999 and Taylor 2006), then even he, who is 
known as one of the sharpest critics of rationalistic theories of ethics25, would 
belong to the Aristotelian framework (despite, of course, important differences 
regarding many aspects of Aristotle’s ethics). Hume wanted to prove “that 
reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that 
it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will” (Hume 1968: 413). 
According to Hume, the widespread and canonical Aristotelian view that 
decision and deed are based and must be based on long and thorough rational 
deliberation is delusive26. When the aim is given – that is, when there is an 
inclination to a certain aim – then reason can help to find good and right means 
to achieve that goal, but reason is not capable of much more. And unlike in 
Aristotle, this inclination is no longer submitted to rational deliberation in any 
                                                     
24  In the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy the following is stated about virtue ethics: 
“They [proponents of virtue ethics] also claim that virtue ethics is truer to human psychology 
in concentrating on the less conscious aspects of motivation – on relatively stable 
dispositions, habits, and long-term goals, for example – where modern ethics focuses on 
decision making directed by principles and rules.” (Garcia 1996: 841) 
25  Cf. Hume 1968: 413: “Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, 
than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and assert 
that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. Every rational 
creature, `tis said, is oblig’d to regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or 
principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, till it be entirely 
subdu’d, or at least brought to a conformity with that superior principle. On this method of 
thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, ancient and modern, seems to be founded; nor 
is there an ampler field, as well for metaphysical arguments, as popular declamations, than 
this suppos’d pre-eminence of reason above passion. The eternity, invariableness, and divine 
origin of the former have been display’d to the best advantage: The blindness, unconstancy, 
and deceitfulness of the latter have been as strongly insisted on.” 
26  Compare with the words of known Hume interpreter Stroud (1981: 155): “Thousands of 
hours of information gathering, hypothetical reasoning, and deliberation went into the 
invasion of France on D-Day, for example, and finally the event occurred. Isn’t something 
like that also often the case for individual human beings who deliberate and then decide what 
to do? They seem to be trying to determine or discover what they should do, or what is the 
best thing for them to do, and it seems as if they often succeed, and then, as a result of that 
discovery, act. […] Hume thinks this conception of reason and its relation to action is 
completely mistaken.” 
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way. But insofar as Hume regards every virtuous deed or behaviour “only as a 
sign of some quality or character” (Hume 1968: 575; cf. Johnson 1990: 159–
160) and insofar as he understands them as resulting from a firm and fixed 
character or principle (“proceeding from any constant principle”), as Aristotle 
did, to that extent even he can be broadly seen as belonging (as a representative 
of virtue ethics) to the framework of Aristotelian understanding or con-
ceptualization of decision; as leaning on one of its pillars. 
Virtue ethics, of course, has taken many different forms, which has led 
Marta Nussbaum (1999) to doubt whether we can even speak of a single 
movement called “virtue ethics”. Important and pertinent in the given context 
among the forms she highlights is the neo-Humean virtue ethics group, which is 
said to include Philippa Foot, Simon Blackburn, MacIntyre et al. (Nussbaum 
1999). About this group Nussbaum writes: “For all of our neo-Humeans, then, 
the turn to virtue ethics is a way of reducing reason’s exorbitant demands and 
pretensions to authority; it is a way of grounding morality in other features of 
human nature.” (Nussbaum 1999: 195) A little further on, she claims specifi-
cally about MacIntyre: “[He] appeals frequently to Aristotle; he appears drawn 
to the Aristotelian tradition. But even in interpreting Aristotle’s own thought he 
ignores Aristotle’s tremendous stress on deliberation and reflection […]” (Nuss-
baum 1999: 197). Thus, it seems that what Aristotle tried to unite in his ethics 
(virtues of character and rationality) has some problems coexisting in some of 
the later treatments.  
Till now we have mostly spoken about a constant and lasting character or 
disposition on which decisions and deeds are based. But Aristotle, as well as 
Hume and many others (in the above quotation Nussbaum also mentions 
“human nature”), also makes essentialistic generalizations about human nature 
as a whole. For this reason, one can generally claim that insofar as a certain 
human nature or essential traits inherent to all human beings are postulated (like 
compassion or benevolence) and can be taken as forming the basis for human 
decisions and deeds, then one can quite broadly still speak of the Aristotelian 
framework and of one of its pillars. That is why this framework is understood 
here precisely in opposition to Derrida’s conception of decision, which excludes 
the fact that decision is based on a constant principle, be it individual character, 
some hypothetical human nature and essence or even causality. 
What is said in this short subchapter is, of course, not meant to prove that all 
conceptions of decision in the history of philosophy are in some sense Aristo-
telian (that is, accept one of the cornerstones of Aristotle’s treatment) or that the 
Aristotelian conception is implicitly present in all theories of action and 
morality.27 The aim of this subchapter was only to demonstrate that the Aristo-
telian treatment of decision, insofar as it can be found either implicitly or expli-
citly in influential philosophical movements, has certainly dominated, to the 
                                                     
27  For example in my Master’s thesis (Sooväli 2008), I showed that in some sense (but not 
precisely in Derrida’s sense) one could also describe Kierkegaard’s treatment of decision as 
heretical. 
33 
point where even in the general dictionary of philosophical terminology “de-
cision” is defined in Aristotelian terms. And as can be seen in Article I, even 
Derrida’s own “concept” of decision, which accepts neither of the pillars of 
Aristotle’s conception (or in other words, which clearly rejects both of them), 
has not remained untouched and uninfluenced by it. Derrida’s conception of 
decision has been called heretical (cf. Article I), but heresy as such always re-




5. DECISION AS HERESY 
Insofar as the examined criticism of the “subject” performed by Nietzsche and 
Derrida also undermines and calls into question the traditional understanding of 
decision or, at least, some of its most important aspects, it entails a need to con-
ceptualize decision somewhat differently and anew. Hence, Derrida’s attempt to 
understand and thematize decision in a novel way, his so-called heretical 
treatment of decision – which, having been analyzed in Article I, does not need to 
be repeated here – ensues in some sense “logically” from his criticism of the 
“subject”. At this point, the question about the possible advantages and dis-
advantages of his reinterpretation of the phenomenon of decision is not only 
justified but in some sense even necessary; for example, what possible impli-
cations and consequences would it have for the very specific decisions made in 
concrete situations? 
The problem is that if one is to believe that Derrida’s understanding of 
decision somehow prepares us for concrete decisions or if one hopes to find in 
his approach clear guidelines or methodological support (similarly, for example, 
to decision theories) that would help people to take better and more adequate 
decisions, then one has missed the point of his analyses from the outset. De-
cision as decision, despite the fact that it must be preceded by thorough rational 
deliberation and analysis of the situation, cannot in Derrida’s view result from 
that deliberation (for example, from some kind of calculation of expected 
utility). The very decisiveness of the decision presupposes a more or less radical 
breakaway from the preceding deliberations, calculations, rules or some ethical 
programme (for example, Kant’s famous categorical imperative). The same 
applies to the thematization of decision itself – Derrida thematizes it in such a 
way that it cannot form some theoretical basis or support for concrete deci-
sions – otherwise his treatment of decision would annul itself. According to 
Derrida, without this mentioned breakaway and cut, there would only be a dull, 
mechanical application and putting into operation of the cognitive apparatus. 
And by emphasizing this decisive interruption and absolute beginning and 
initiation, Derrida is referring to something immemorial that the concept of 
decision has always, in one form or another, presupposed, among others also in 
Aristotle himself. In this sense (and in spite of its being heretical or heretical-
ness), also Derrida’s treatment is in some sense still quite “traditional”, although 
he does significantly change the meaning of this interruption and absolute 
beginning by understanding it on completely different grounds. 
But precisely this fact – that Derrida’s account of decision cannot offer any 
concrete guidelines or programme for making “better” decisions – has been 
regarded by some (including Dominic Moran 2002) as one of its greatest 
deficiencies.28 Utilitarians and pragmatists, even if they accepted the pertinence 
                                                     
28  Cf. Critchley 1999: 275: “Derrida insists that judgements have to be made and decisions 
to be taken, provided it is understood that they must pass through an experience of the 
undecidable. But then, what decisions are taken, which judgements are made?” 
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of Derrida’s theoretical analyses regarding the concept of decision, might ask: 
what “use” does it all have? Also, Richard Rorty (1996), who greatly respects 
Derrida’s earlier deconstruction and criticism of metaphysics, regards his 
“moral philosophy” as utopian and apparently useless or without consequence. 
One other widespread argument (which is related to the first) against 
Derrida’s understanding of decision (see Article I) asks the following question: 
since Derrida accentuates and underlines a radical break from and interruption 
with every kind of rational deliberation, rules, laws etc., does he not turn 
decision into something completely arbitrary and random, something based on 
the randomness of “pure will” (cf. Lilla 2001: 190) or the “emotional storm” of 
the decision-maker (cf. Sokoloff 2002: 190)? 
However, one could also see it as an advantage that Derrida does not offer 
concrete guidelines for taking particular decisions. The first thing that should be 
emphasized is that this interruption and undecidable as a moment of absolute 
darkness in the instant of the decision is, according to Derrida, the condition of 
possibility of ethics. If decision were based on rational deliberation, rules or 
calculation of probability, then it would be something more or less mechanical 
and programmed and, as such, it would help to avoid responsibility and exclude 
ethical problems and dilemmas. Secondly, all of the possible rules, laws (with 
regard to legal decisions), calculations, programmes and theories on which the 
concept of decision has been based by different conceptualizations and 
approaches do not take into account the singularity or the otherness of the other 
and can be unjust. Decision which follows a programme is in some sense a priori 
destruction of the other (Sokoloff 2002: 347). For example, a decision of a judge 
has to follow the law, but this very law itself might be unjust (see Article I). 
Furthermore, the generality of the law overlooks the particularity of the individual 
case. Derrida, insofar as he takes the interruption and the undecidable strictly into 
account, retains in every decision a certain openness to a greater justice towards 
the singularity of the other, as well as an openness to modification of the law and 
rules. But this openness is at the same time, of course, also openness to “evil” and 
perjury. Derrida himself also admits this last possibility by writing: “Sans la 
possibilité du mal radical, du parjure et du crime absolu, aucune responsabilité, 
aucune liberté, aucune décision.” (Derrida 1994, 247) 
The condition of good and just (but actually every) decision is, as it appears, 
the possibility of absolute errancy. But Derrida seems to accentuate above all 
this absolute respect and responsibility for the singularity of the other: as 
Sokoloff (2002:346) writes, “a non-appropriative respect for others” is to be 
taken as a kind of ethical border of decision. If one adds here that in spite of the 
undecidable as the condition of possibility of decision Derrida paradoxically 
also emphasizes the necessity of deliberation and consideration of laws (see 
Article I), then the claim that in Derrida’s thought decision is based on the 
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arbitrariness of “pure will”29 turns out to be untenable. On the other hand, 
Derrida does seem to diminish the importance and import of this possibility of 
absolute errancy. The undecidable as an absolute break with preceding 
deliberation etc. can in principle lead to even greater exploitation of the other as 
the following of some programme or calculation. Derrida indeed admits (but 
does not speak at length about) the possibility that the other in me can also be 
something “evil”.30 But regardless of this, Derrida mostly speaks of the absolute 
respect for the singularity of the other, the possibility of which appears after one 
has deconstructed every sort of egological immanence and subject-centeredness, 
and understood that decision is in some sense always taken by the other in the 
decision-maker 
Thus, in some sense at least, it is rather an advantage – the possibility of 
decision and “freedom” – that Derrida’s treatment of decision does not offer us 
concrete guidelines for taking decisions. But in its own way, Derrida’s approach 
can nevertheless influence our decisions. Insofar as it demonstrates, with the 
help of the aporias found in the concept of decision, how difficult, if not im-
possible, it is to take a decision; insofar as it refers to the fact that we can never 
be completely certain that we have made a decision, not to mention whether the 
decision was good or just; insofar as it brings an aspect of doubt and self-
criticism into every “good conscience” by means of that uncertainty, to that 
extent Derrida’s understanding of decision can have more or less direct ethical-
political consequences. According to him, this disquietude and uncertainty 
regarding one’s decisions and actions is a positive ethical force. His treatment 
of decision seems to exclude the possibility that one could ever be completely 
satisfied with one’s decisions, that one could believe one’s decisions were good 
and just or that one has done enough. 
The following line of argumentation can be added here: Nietzsche had 
already earlier stated that old morality and moral philosophy had not only 
become incredible – since its basis and guarantor, God, had become incredible 
and impudent hypothesis – but also dull and boring (cf. Nietzsche 1988, vol. 5: 
163); more refined and demanding persons, according to Nietzsche, kept away 
from it. Does not Derrida’s ethical-political discourse, with its absolute de-
mands, aporias and twists – having accepted and adopted Nietzsche’s insight 
that morality cannot ultimately be grounded (according to Nietzsche, moral 
philosophy  had always tried to ground morality) – turn, in its own performative 
way, morality and moral philosophy back into something “interesting”? One 
might argue that also in this sense could Derrida’s analyses of decision, 
responsibility etc. have a direct impact on people’s “morality”. 
 
                                                     
29  Not to mention, of course, that the possibility of some “pure will” is excluded in the 
thought of Derrida and belongs to the egological immanence Derrida has taken on to 
deconstruct. 
30  In this sense, one can partly agree with what Moran writes (2002: 116): “Deconstruc-
tion’s relation with notions such as “the good” is far more equivocal than many of Derrida’s 
recent pronouncments would indicate.” 
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CONCLUSION 
In my dissertation I argue that it is possible and sound to speak about two in 
some ways certainly interrelated but still fundamentally and radically different 
conceptions of decision. One of these conceptions, which, in this study, has 
been called the traditional and dominating understanding of decision, is seen to 
originate from Aristotle; the other, which is designated as an heretical “con-
ception”, derives from the works of Jacques Derrida.  
Heresy is a certain system of beliefs or theory that is at variance with the 
accepted theory or system of beliefs. It must be emphasized that the condition 
of possibility of heresy can only be orthodoxy itself – there can only be heresy 
in this breaking with and away from the orthodoxy, and such a breaking always 
involves a certain dependence on, and belonging to, the orthodoxy. Derrida’s 
conception of decision seems to have precisely this kind of relationship to 
Aristotelian conception of decision – breaking away from it and belonging to it 
at the same time. However, not only is Derrida’s understanding of decision 
heretical with respect to Aristotle’s conception: decision itself, as it appears 
from Derrida’s thematisation, turns out to be also a sort of heresy – heresy in 
the face of rational deliberations, calculations of utility, common norms, values 
and demands. The word “heresy” itself comes from the Greek hairesis which 
means precisely choice or decision but more generally also the act of violent 
taking, as for example when soldiers storm the city. It must be mentioned that 
Derrida himself has not understood his conception of decision as heretical with 
respect to Aristotelian conception, thus the main contribution of the thesis 
consists precisely in detailed contrasting of Derrida’s conception with the 
Aristotelian one and thereby bringing out the very hereticalness of Derrida’s 
conception. This sheds also an important light on the conditions and historical 
development of the concept of decision. 
My study is motivated by the problems surrounding the concept of the 
“subject”. The way the “subject” or decision-maker is explicitly or implicitly 
understood, determines the way decision itself is understood. The traditional 
conception of decision, as shown in the thesis, is based on a certain more or less 
coherent concept of the “subject” or decision-maker. This concept of the subject 
is, for example, characterized by self-knowledge, autonomy, activity, identity, 
self-consciousness, and guiding rationality. But precisely these characteristics 
of the subject have been repeatedly and for more than hundred years now, called 
into question by very many different authors and even traditions. Decision and 
the closely related concept of responsibility should therefore be re-thematized, 
without presuming a predominantly autonomous, self-identical and rational 
agent. 
Taking the aforesaid into account, my thesis can be structured in the fol-
lowing way: Firstly, I have outlined Aristotle’s concept of decision and ana-
lysed problems and difficulties related to it. It has been demonstrated that Aris-
totle understands decision (a) as an expression of a firm and constant dispo-
sition, be it virtuous or not, acquired through long practice and education; and 
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(b) as resulting from rational deliberation and calculation. I have argued that a 
certain tension can be seen between these two determinations. In some places, 
Aristotle (c) also ascribes a syllogistic structure to this aforementioned rational 
deliberation and seems thereby to annul decision as such. Besides this, (d) the 
decision-maker, according to Aristotle, knows himself and knows himself as a 
decision-maker; he also knows the conditions and circumstances surrounding 
his decision and decision-making (what he does, for what purpose, by what 
means etc.). And finally, (e) the rightness or correctness of decision is 
guaranteed by ethical as well as dianoetic virtues. 
Secondly, I have argued in brief that Aristotle presents a general framework 
that captures a large part or even the majority of later approaches to decision. 
Even if these later approaches differ from Aristotle’s conceptions considerably 
or sharply in some respects, they still hold some important and “inherent” 
components – mainly, one (or both) of the first two mentioned characteristics – 
of his conception and thematisation. 
Thirdly, it has been argued that Nietzsche’s and Derrida’s criticism of the so-
called “subject” encompasses some of the implicit and explicit presuppositions 
on which Aristotelian concepts of decision are based. To these presuppositions 
that the deconstruction of the “subject” calls into question belong, among other 
things, the activity and voluntariness of the decision-maker, the firm and 
constant disposition as the basis of decision, self-awareness and a certain 
extreme rationality of the decision-maker. This deconstruction, which no longer 
allows decision to be thematized in the way Aristotle did, is therefore also 
argued to be one of the main reasons and motivations as to why Derrida deems 
it necessary to depart from the Aristotelian conception and create a new one 
which would be independent of these assumptions and presuppositions. 
Fourthly, I have outlined Derrida’s heretical “concept” of decision and 
contrasted it with Aristotle’s concept. It has been argued that Derrida not only 
problematizes or radicalizes many of the aspects of Aristotelian (and Aris-
totle’s) treatment of decision, but also breaks away from it in some important 
respects. It has been demonstrated, namely, that for Derrida decision is no 
longer based on the activity and autonomy of the decision-maker or “subject”, 
but should rather be understood as something “passive”, “heteronomous” and 
partially even “unconscious”. Decision, according to Derrida, is the decision of 
the “wholly other in me” and does not simply follow on from some egological 
immanence. Finally, I have also analyzed the ethical and political implications 
of Derrida’s understanding of decision and addressed some of the criticism 
aimed at it. I have argued that far from leading to and founding or justifying 
nihilism or ethical indifference, Derrida’s conception of decision is rather 
directed towards absolute respect for the singularity of the other and can there-
fore be understood as raising the very stakes of ethics – even if, according to 
Derrida, this raising the stakes of responsibility and ethics in general can only 
occur at the price of the possibility of absolute failure and errancy. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Käesolev väitekiri “Otsus kui hereesia” keskendub otsuse (ingl. decision, pr. 
décision, sks. Entscheidung) mõistele. Uurimuses näidatakse, et on võimalik ja 
mõttekas kõnelda kahest teineteisega küll mitmes mõttes seotud, kuid seejuures 
omavahel siiski põhimõtteliselt ja radikaalselt erinevast otsusekäsitusest. Ühte 
neist käsitusist, mida uurimuses on nimetatud traditsiooniliseks ja dominee-
rivaks, nähakse pärinevat Aristoteleselt, teist, mida uurimuses nimetatakse selle 
traditsioonilise käsituse suhtes hereetiliseks, Jacques Derrida töödest.  
Hereesia on teatav uskumuste süsteem või teooria, mis lahkneb üleüldiselt 
omaksvõetud uskumuste süsteemist või teooriast. Seejuures tuleb rõhutada, et 
hereesia võimalikkuse tingimus saab olla ainult ortodoksia ise – hereesia saab 
eksisteerida ainult selles ära- ja lahti murdmises ortodoksiast, ja selline lahti-
murdmine sisaldab endas alati ka teatavat sõltuvust ortodoksiast. Derrida 
otsusekäsitusel paistab olevat just selline suhe Aristotelese otsusekontsept-
siooniga – ühelt poolt ta lahkneb sellest mõningates väga kesksetes aspektides, 
kuid teiselt poolt ta mingis mõttes siiski ka kuulub sellesse. Kuid hereetiline ei 
ole mitte ainult Derrida otsusekäsitus, vaid ka otsus ise, nii nagu see selles 
käsituses ilmneb, kujutab endast teatavat hereesiat – hereesiat mõistusliku 
kaalutluse, omaksvõetud normide ja väärtuste suhtes. Sõna “hereesia” ise päri-
neb kreeka sõnast hairesis, mis tähendab just valikut või otsust, üldisemalt aga 
ka tormakat haaramisakti. Kuna Derrida ise ei ole mõistnud oma otsusekäsitust 
Aristotelese kontseptsiooni suhtes hereetilisena, seisnebki töö uudsus Derrida 
käsituse üksikasjalikus vastandamises traditsioonilisele aristoteleslikule käsitu-
sele ning seeläbi Derrida käsituse hereetilisuse esiletoomises. See heidab ka 
olulist valgust otsuse mõiste ajaloolisele arengule ja tingimustele.     
Uurimistöö taustaks ja motivatsiooniks on probleemid, mis ümbritsevad 
“subjekti” mõistet. Rohkem kui viimase saja aasta vältel on korduvalt ja üsna 
erinevate autorite poolt seatud küsimuse alla autonoomne, aktiivne, ratsionaalne 
ja rohkem või vähem püsiva identiteediga “subjekt“. Kui see ettekujutus püsiva 
identiteediga ratsionaalsest ja autonoomsest otsustajast ei ole enam aga täieli-
kult usaldusväärne, kui meil on tõsiseid põhjuseid, mida siinses uurimuses on ka 
vaadeldud, selle usaldusväärsuses kahelda, siis ei ole enam võimalik mõista ot-
sust millegi pelgalt autonoomse, püsival loomuseadumusel ja/või ratsionaalsel 
kaalutlusel põhineva nähtusena, nagu seda on omal moel teinud Aristoteles ja 
suur hulk teisi mõtlejaid, ja mille kohta leidub hulgaliselt näiteid veel täna-
päevalgi. Kõnealust “subjekti” kriitikat rangelt arvesse võttes ja sellesse ka ise 
aktiivselt panustades, mõistab Derrida seetõttu otsust hoopis teistelt alustelt.      
Eelöeldut silmas pidades visandatakse uurimistöös e s i t e k s  “Nikomachose 
eetikale” tuginedes, kuid samas ka “Eudemose eetikat” osaliselt arvesse võttes 
Aristotelese otsusekäsitus (otsusena on talt tõlgitud sõna prohairesis). Edasi 
eritletakse ja tõlgendatakse sellega seotud raskuspunkte ning tuuakse välja 
eeldused ja mõisted – nagu vabatahtlik(kus) (hekôn), püsiv loomuseadumus 
(hexis), voorus (aretê), mõistuslik kaalutlus (bouleusis) jne. –, millele see 
otsusekäsitus põhineb. T e i s e k s  näidatakse, mis tähenduses on see Aristote-
lese käsitus aluseks suurele osale hilisemaist otsusekäsitusist, olgu nad siis kas 
eksplitsiitsed või implitsiitselt kätketud erinevates moraali- ja teoteooriates. 
Väide seisneb selles, et Aristoteles on esitanud teatava üldise raamistiku või 
sõrestiku, millesse on ette haaratud suur osa hilisemaid filosoofilisi otsuse-
käsitusi. Ning isegi siis, kui need hilisemad käsitused erinevad oma teatud 
aspektide poolest oluliselt või koguni väga reljeefselt ja teravalt Aristotelese 
enda omast, kätkeb suur osa neist ometi mingit olulist ja “olemuslikku” kompo-
nenti Aristotelese käsitusest ja mõistestikust.  
K o l m a n d a k s  võetakse vaatluse alla Friedrich Nietzsche kui ses küsi-
muses Derrida ühe peamise mõjutaja ning Derrida enda niinimetatud “subjekti” 
“dekonstruktsioon” või kriitika. Selle dekonstruktsiooni eesmärgiks, nagu 
uurimistöös väidetud, ei ole mitte “subjekti” hävitamine ja “surm“, nagu 
dekonstruktsiooni sageli on tõlgendatud, vaid hoopis selle uuesti tõlgendamine 
sellisel viisil, mis võtab ühtlasi arvesse sissevaateid, mis on näiteks saavutatud 
“teadvustamatuse” valdkonnas. Kuna nüüd see dekonstruktsioon, nagu uuri-
muses on eritletud, puudutab ja hõlmab nii Aristotelese otsuse-mõistmise enda 
kui ka hilisemate aristoteleslike käsituste nii ilmseid kui ka varjatud eeldusi, see 
tähendab õõnestab vähemalt osa neist eeldustest, seades need küsitavaks, loob 
see ühtlasi ka vajaduse uue, nendel eeldustel mittepõhineva, neist sõltumatu 
otsuse-mõistmise järele. Seetõttu on seda “subjekti” dekonstrueerimist käes-
olevas uurimuses mõistetud ühe peamise põhjuse ja motivatsioonina, mille-
pärast Derrida lööb olulistes punktides lahku Aristotelese otsusekäsitusest ning 
hakkab otsust käsitama hoopis teistelt, osaliselt koguni vastandlikelt, mitte-
aristoteleslikelt alustelt. Nende eelduste hulka, mille see subjekti dekonstrueeri-
mine küsitavaks seab, kuuluvad muu hulgas “subjekti” aktiivsus ja vaba-
tahtlikkus otsustamisel, püsiv loomuseadumus (ja voorus kui loomutäius) kui 
teatav identiteet, millest otsused võivad tuleneda mingis mõttes automaatselt, 
ning viimaks ja võib-olla olulisimalt äärmuslik ratsionaalsus, mis allutab otsuse 
puhtale ratsionaalsele kalkulatsioonile. 
 N e l j a n d a k s  võetaksegi vaatluse alla ja eritletakse Derrida enda otsuse-
käsitust. Derrida ei ole seda oma käsitust esitanud mingis ühes kindlas teoses 
ega rangelt süstemaatilises vormis, pigem leidub see mõneti laiali hajutatult ta 
rohketes – eelkõige hilisemates – erinevatele filosoofilistele probleemidele 
pühendatud teostes. Kuid sellest mõningasest hajutatusest hoolimata moodustab 
Derrida otsusekäsitus sellegipoolest üsna selgelt piiritletud terviku. Uurimistöös 
eritletakse Derrida otsusekäsituse raskuspunkte ja probleeme ning ka selle 
eetilisi aspekte, selgitatakse apooriaid, mis seda iseloomustavad. Samuti vastan-
datakse see käsitus Aristotelese otsuse-mõistele, näidates detailselt, et Derrida 
käsitus mitte ainult – sest ta teeb muuhulgas ka seda! – ei problematiseeri ega 
radikaliseeri Aristotelese mõiste mitmeid aluseid ja tunnuseid, vaid lahkneb 
neist mõnes olulises punktis väga reljeefselt ja otsustavalt. Uurimuses on väide-
tud, et Derrida ei mõista otsust mitte enam “subjekti” ratsionaalsusel, aktiiv-
susel, autonoomsusel ja/või püsival loomuseadumusel, vaid pigem just teataval 
“heteronoomsusel” ning “passiivsusel” põhinevana. Samuti on toodud esile 
kaalutluse paradoksaalne roll Derrida otsusekäsituses. Uurimuses on käsitletud 
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ka kriitikat, mida eri autorid on Derrida käsituse kohta teinud, ning vaadeldud 
selle paikapidavust. Vähemalt osaliselt on püütud Derrida filosoofilist posit-
siooni ka filosoofiliselt õigustada. Sellega seoses on uurimuses jõutud seisu-
kohale, et Derrida käsitus ei ole mitte “nihilistlik” ega põhjenda ning samuti 
põhjusta eetilist ükskõiksust, vaid – vastupidi – täiendab ja avardab eetilist 
nõudlikkust. Kuid see eetika täiendamine, täiustamine ja võimendamine saab 
Derrida järgi sündida ainult siis, kui otsuse langetamisel ei ole välistatud abso-
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Greifswald, Mai 2008 
„Die Abwesenheit des Ich und das Fremde des Bewusstseins” – Congrès 
international: «Lectures du Gai Savoir», GIRN, Reims, March 2009 
„Nietzsche in Derridas Politiques de l’amitié” – Congrès international: 
«Nietzsche penseur de la politique? Nietzsche penseur du social?», Forum 
International de Philosophie Sociale et Politique, Toulouse, July 2009 
„,Dies – habe ich gethan’” – III Covegno Internationale «Letture del Crepuscolo 
degli Idoli», GIRN, Pisa, April 2010 
„The Coming of Perhaps” – Conference “Derrida Today”, London, July 2010 
„Die Verzauberung der Tugend” – Treffen mit der Niederländischen Nietzsche-
Forschungsgruppe, Wassenaar, March 2011 
„The Absence and the Other” – Nietzsche Seminar, Lisbon, September 2011 
„Translation and/or Transformation” – Congrès International “Aurore comme 
tournant de l’œuvre de Nietzsche ? Renversement des valeurs et avenir de 
l’humanité”, GIRN, Lisbon, June 2012 
“Kõik selle maailma Aabrahamid” – Konverents “Kierkegaardi pärand 
tänapäevase mõttearenduse kontekstis”, Tartu, May 2013 
“Ab-Gründe der Nietzscheschen Loslösung von Wagner” – International 
Conference “Nietzsche with Wagner / Nietzsche contra Wagner“, GIRN, 






Selection of Publications 
„Moraali genealoogiline enese-tühistus”. Friedrich Nietzsche, „Moraali genea-
loogiast”, Tallinn: Varrak, 2013 (forthcoming) 
“Entscheidung als Häresie”. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 2013 (forthcoming) 
“The Absence and The Other: Nietzsche and Derrida against Husserl”. As The 
Spider Spins: Essays on Nietzsche’s Critique and Use of Language, edited 
by J. Constâncio and M. J. Mayer Branco, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2012, 
pp. 161–177 
„Tõlkimine kui transformatsioon”. Akadeemia, no. 6, 2012, pp. 1082–1088 
“Tahtest: Katkendeid teostest”. Akadeemia, no. 5, 2011, pp. 902–911   
“Saateks: Tahte genealoogia ja fenomenoloogia”. Akadeemia, no. 5, 2011,  
pp. 902–911 
„Die Abwesenheit des Ich und das Fremde des Bewusstseins”. Lettura della 
Gaia scienza. Lectures du Gai savoir, Nietzscheana 14, edited by C. 
Piazzesi, G. Campioni, P. Woltling, Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2010, pp. 173–186 
„Was ist das souveräne Individuum?”, Nietzsche-Studien, edited by W. Steg-
maier / G. Abel, vol. 38, 2009, pp. 477–485   
„Antikristus kui antinoomia”. Friedrich Nietzsche, Antikristus, Tartu: Zeus, 
2007, lk. 145–160 
„Kommentaarid Friedrich Nietzsche “Antikristusele””. Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Antikristus, Tartu: Zeus, 2007, pp. 101–145  





Nimi:          Jaanus Sooväli 
Sünniaeg:   01.11.1982, Rakvere 
E-post:       jaanus.soovali@ut.ee  
Telefon:      5353 6302 
 
Haridustee 
2008 –          Doktorantuur Tartu Ülikooli filosoofia osakonnas  
2006–2008    Magistriõpingud Tartu Ülikoolis filosoofia erialal (cum laude) 
2001–2006    Bakalaureuseõpe Tartu Ülikooli usuteaduskonnas  
1998–2001    Rakvere Reaalgümnaasium 
 
Akadeemiline enesetäiendus 
– Oktoober 2008 – märts 2009 uurimistöö Greifswaldi ülikoolis, juhendaja 
prof. Werner Stegmaier 
– Jaanuar 2010 – juuli 2010 uurimistöö Greifswaldi ülikoolis, juhendaja prof. 
Werner Stegmaier 
– Oktoober 2010 – märts 2011 uurimistöö Greifswaldi ülikoolis, juhendaja 
prof. Werner Stegmaier 
– Jaanuar 2012 – aprill 2012 uurimistöö Weimaris Anna Amalia raamatukogus 
– Mai 2012 – juuli 2012 uurimistöö Lissaboni ülikooli Universidade Nova de 
Lisboa keelefilosoofia instituudis 
 
Teadustöö põhisuunad 
– Filosoofia ajalugu (antiikfilosoofia, 19.–20. sajandi filosoofia), fenomeno-
loogia, dekonstruktsioon, ühiskonnateadused ja kultuur, eetika, esteetika 
 
Akadeemilised ametikohad 




– Theorien der Entscheidung (Greifswaldi Ülikool, Saksamaa) 
– Jacques Derrida, “Den Tod geben” (Greifswaldi Ülikool, Saksamaa) 
– Jacques Derrida, “Die Stimme und das Phänomen” (Greifswaldi Ülikool, 
Saksamaa) 
 
Teadusorganisatsiooniline tegevus ja liikmelisus  
2008             Moderaator Eesti filosoofia aastakonverentsil “Eesti filosoofia 
juured, võrsed ja õied”   
2009–           Groupe International de Recherches sur Nietzsche (GIRN), liige 
2008–2011  Nietzsche Research Group of Greifswald, liige  
2011–          Nietzsche International Lab (NIL), liige  
 
150 
Tunnustused ja stipendiumid 
2013              DoRa T8 stipendium  
2012              Ajakirja “Akadeemia” tõlkepreemia 
2012              DoRa T6 stipendium 
2011              Trebuth-Stiftung’i uurimisstipendium  
2010              Gustav Teichmülleri stipendium 
2010              DoRa T8 stipendium  
2009–2010     Trebuth-Stiftung’i uurimisstipendium 
 
Ettekanded konverentsidel 
„Nietzsches Begriff der Entscheidung” – Nietzsches neue Philologie, Greifs-
wald, mai 2008 
„Die Abwesenheit des Ich und das Fremde des Bewusstseins” – Congrès inter-
national: “Lectures du Gai Savoir“, GIRN, Reims, märts 2009 
„Nietzsche in Derridas Politiques de l’amitié” – Congrès international 
“Nietzsche penseur de la politique? Nietzsche penseur du social?“, Forum 
International de Philosophie Sociale et Politique, Toulouse, juuli 2009  
„‘Dies – habe ich gethan’” – III Covegno Internationale “Letture del Crepuscolo 
degli Idoli”, GIRN, Pisa, aprill 2010 
„The Coming of Perhaps” – Derrida Today, London, juuli 2010 
„Die Verzauberung der Tugend” – Treffen mit der Niederländischen Nietzsche-
Forschungsgruppe, Wassenaar, märts 2011 
„The Absence and the Other” –  Nietzsche seminar, Lissabon, september 2011 
„Translation as Transformation” – Congrès international “Aurore comme tour-
nant de l’œuvre de Nietzsche? Renversement des valeurs et avenir de 
l’humanité”, GIRN, Lissabon, juuni 2012 
“Kõik selle maailma Aabrahamid” – Konverents “Kierkegaardi pärand täna-
päevase mõttearenduse kontekstis”, Tartu, mai 2013 
„Ab-Gründe der Nietzscheschen Loslösung von Wagner” – Convegno inter-
natzionale “Nietzsche con Wagner / Nietzsche contra Wagner”, GIRN, Pisa, 
juuni 2013 
 
Valik publikatsioone  
„Moraali genealoogiline enese-tühistus”. Friedrich Nietzsche, Moraali genea-
loogiast, Varrak, 2013 (ilmumas) 
“Entscheidung als Häresie”. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 2013 (ilmumas) 
“The Absence and The Other : Nietzsche and Derrida against Husserl”. As The 
Spider Spins: Essays on Nietzsche’s Critique and Use of Language, edited 
by J. Constâncio and M. J. Mayer Branco, Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter, 2012, 
lk. 161–177 
“Tõlkimine kui transformatsioon”. Akadeemia, nr. 6, 2012, lk. 1082–1088 
“Tahtest: Katkendeid teostest”. Akadeemia, nr. 5, 2011, lk. 902–911   




„Die Abwesenheit des Ich und das Fremde des Bewusstseins”. Lettura della 
Gaia scienza. Lectures du Gai savoir, Nietzscheana 14, edited by C. Piaz-
zesi, G. Campioni, P. Woltling, Pisa, Edizioni ETS, 2010, lk. 173–186 
„Was ist das souveräne Individuum?”, Nietzsche-Studien, edited by W. Steg-
maier / G. Abel, vol. 38, 2009, lk. 477–485   
„Antikristus kui antinoomia”. Friedrich Nietzsche, Antikristus, Zeus, 2007,  
lk. 145–160 
Kommentaarid Friedrich Nietzsche “Antikristusele”. Friedrich Nietzsche, Anti-
kristus, Zeus, 2007, lk. 101–145  
„Tragöödia sünd: Saatürlik Schauspiel”. Teater. Muusika. Kino, nr. 8–9, 2007, 

















1.  Jüri Eintalu. The problem of induction: the presuppositions revisited. Tartu, 
2001. 
2.  Roomet Jakapi. Berkeley, mysteries, and meaning: a critique of the non-
cognitivist interpretation. Tartu, 2002. 
3.  Endla Lõhkivi. The sociology of scientific knowledge: a philosophical 
perspective. Tartu, 2002. 
4.  Kadri Simm. Benefit-sharing: an inquiry into justification. Tartu, 2005. 
5. Marek Volt. The epistemic and logical role of definition in the evaluation of 
art. Tartu, 2006.  
6.  Aive Pevkur. Professional ethics: philosophy and practice. Tartu, 2011. 
7. Toomas Lott. Plato on Belief (doxa) Theaetetus 184B–187A. Tartu, 2012, 
208 p. 
 
